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Forex multi-account manager Z-X-N
Accepts global forex account operation, investment, and trading
Assists family office investment and autonomous management

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In the two-way trading system of forex investment, there is a widely circulated argument that forex currency investment is the optimal path for ordinary traders to achieve upward mobility. Its core supporting arguments are a low entry barrier, no need for interpersonal collaboration, and extremely high potential returns if trading bottlenecks are successfully overcome.

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However, as a large-scale forex investor, my stance on such claims is clear and firm: those who instill such views in forex traders are all driven by greed and disregard morality. To rigorously discuss the essence of forex trading, especially forex currency investment, the primary truth to clarify is that forex currency investment is essentially a risk trap tailored to the weaknesses of human nature. The core operating logic of this trap lies in inducing traders to lower their risk awareness and invest their own funds by weaving illusory narratives such as "wealth is within reach" and "you are the chosen one." Its ultimate goal is singular and clear—to plunder the trader's accumulated wealth. When traders naively believe such false claims and invest funds, by the time they realize the truth, their wealth has often been completely wiped out.
A set of core concepts needs to be clearly defined: The possibility of profit in the forex market is undeniable; however, for the vast majority of ordinary forex traders, believing they can achieve stable profits in this market is a complete illusion. The reality is that traders who can profit in the forex market are extremely rare, one in a million—this is not an exaggeration. Therefore, while the existence of profit potential in the market is an objective fact, the idea that "individuals can profit in this market" is ultimately just unrealistic wishful thinking for the vast majority of ordinary forex traders.
For most ordinary traders involved in forex trading, there is no need to harbor any illusions; losing all their account funds is their inevitable fate. The core reason for this conclusion lies in the fact that the market's rules, from their inception, have predetermined the disadvantaged position of ordinary traders. Its underlying logic tilts the balance of power towards capital. Many traders suffer from a misconception, viewing other traders as the core counterparties in the market. This perception is fundamentally flawed—the true core counterparties are not within the market trading process itself, but rather exist outside the formulation and control of market rules. The various rules of forex trading, while seemingly fair and impartial, are in reality meticulously designed to precisely target human weaknesses. A thorough analysis of these rules reveals their underlying logic.
The major institutions and forex brokers in the forex market are the true core counterparties for ordinary traders. These two entities are the predetermined beneficiaries of the market's rules. Every trade completed generates commissions for them, which accumulate with each transaction. Ultimately, all their profits originate from the account funds of all ordinary traders. More importantly, market rules are primarily set by major institutions and forex brokers, who also develop and expand market client resources. Transaction fees are shared between these two entities. The relationship between ordinary traders and these major institutions/forex brokers is inherently adversarial; this is undeniable, and they constitute the core adversaries for ordinary traders in the market.
The core issue lies in the fact that trading rules are primarily set by the exchange, and the initial design of each rule aims to maximize the profits of major institutions and forex brokers. This is beyond question, and its operational logic is identical to that of a casino. Take the T+0 trading system as an example: while it superficially grants traders the freedom to buy and sell instantly, it actually provides fertile ground for overtrading. From a human nature perspective, individuals are short-sighted and have a strong craving for immediate feedback: in a profitable state, greed easily arises, leading to increased trading frequency; in a losing state, impulsive thinking easily prevails, similarly exacerbating trading frequency. The T+0 system, lacking restrictions on trading frequency, inevitably leads to the continuous accumulation of transaction fees, causing ordinary traders' funds to flow rapidly into the accounts of major institutions and forex brokers. Looking at the forex margin system, many traders mistakenly see it as a tool to amplify returns. However, in reality, this system amplifies human weaknesses and account volatility—by exploiting greed and fear to induce emotional decisions, it gradually guides traders into a habit of heavy-leverage trading, accelerating the wiping out of account funds and achieving rapid wealth transfer. Two-way trading further amplifies these risks. While superficially offering diversified profit opportunities, it exploits the physiological limitations of human decision-making capacity, combined with the synergistic effect of T+0 and leverage, ultimately leading traders into a state of high-frequency trading, heavy-leverage operations, and emotional instability. Furthermore, various technical analysis theories circulating in the market essentially create the illusion of "certain market patterns," while the daily settlement system is the core vehicle for risk transfer. The aforementioned systems and theories share a highly consistent goal: to cultivate a large number of ordinary traders accustomed to high-leverage, high-frequency, and emotionally driven trading. These traders, in their self-destructive process, continuously generate profits for the main institutions and forex brokers. For ordinary forex traders, it is crucial not to attempt to challenge the limitations of human nature, and even less should they try to escape these risk traps designed by elite groups—any one of these traps is enough to trap a trader in a prolonged predicament from which they cannot recover, and in severe cases, may even lead to tragedies of family ruin and death. It is important to emphasize that this is not an attempt to discourage potential traders, but rather an objective presentation of the true operation of the forex market.
Besides major institutions and forex brokers, ordinary traders' counterparties include various other market participants, encompassing professional institutions, quantitative trading companies, and speculative capital, as well as retail investors similar to ordinary investors. Even within the category of traders, the market position of different entities determines the significant differences in their profitability. Taking transaction fees as an example, there is a fundamental difference between the fee rates of professional institutions and those of ordinary traders. Ordinary traders also have significantly lower fees than large market players; these differences are objectively real and difficult to overcome. Even worse, some retail investors with limited access to information have their fees increased several times over by intermediaries on top of the exchange's benchmark rate. Besides fee differences, professional institutions, quantitative trading companies, and speculative capital possess advantages in every aspect of the trading process that are difficult for ordinary retail investors to match. For example, in risk control, when traders from these professional entities lose control emotionally, a dedicated risk control department will intervene to enforce liquidation; while ordinary traders, once emotionally out of control, often engage in retaliatory heavy trading, ultimately exacerbating account losses. Therefore, for individual traders, achieving profitability in the foreign exchange market is extremely difficult. The market's cruelty far exceeds the traditional saying "one general's success is built on the bones of ten thousand," more accurately reflecting the reality of "one general's success is built on the bones of a hundred thousand." Its essence is a risky market that devours wealth—a fact that is widely acknowledged.
Ultimately, the core role of ordinary forex traders entering this market is that of liquidity providers and risk bearers. This market, by its very nature, is not suitable for ordinary traders. Those retail investors who truly break through in this market have long since transcended the scope of ordinary traders, even surpassing their human characteristics—they may have escaped the shackles of human limitations and are no longer ordinary forex traders tamed by risk traps.

MAM/PAMM condenses "managed trading" into a single web button, but leaves the triple risks of fiduciary responsibility, cross-border penetration, and market impact to regulators and end-investors.

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In the two-way trading of foreign exchange investment, the reason why MAM and PAMM have been rejected by regulatory authorities in the US, Japan, France, and other countries is not due to a lack of technical efficiency, but rather because their "aggregated trading" structure condenses the most sensitive risks in the traditional asset management industry—dilution of qualifications, dispersion of responsibility, and difficulty in tracing fund flows—into a single web link. Once an investor clicks to join, they relinquish control of their entire account to a stranger, while the regulatory framework struggles to capture the complete chain of actions simultaneously within the same jurisdiction and reporting framework. Thus, the three bottom lines of "protecting investors, maintaining market integrity, and preventing systemic risk" are simultaneously eroded.
The investor protection mechanism is the first to be impacted. Aggregated management compresses several small accounts into a logical "single pool of funds," with profits and losses distributed as a percentage. While this appears fair on the surface, it actually completely outsources risk control responsibility to the personal integrity of the fund manager. In reality, many managers do not hold investment advisor or asset management licenses. Aggressive managers pursue monthly returns of 30% using leverage up to 500 times; conservative managers secretly enter into rebate agreements with brokers, using high-frequency trading to extract a share of the spread. Because transaction details only scroll through the server backend, ordinary investors cannot identify abnormal slippage or distinguish between sudden market changes and malicious betting resulting in margin calls. After disputes arise, brokers typically absolve themselves of responsibility by claiming they "only provided access," and managers are often registered in offshore jurisdictions, making it difficult to pinpoint the litigant. Ultimately, almost all losses are borne by the end-user. Article 63 of Japan's Financial Instruments and Exchange Act explicitly prohibits unlicensed institutions from engaging in collective asset management, with its legislative explanation directly stating that "the percentage allocation model conceals fiduciary responsibility and induces moral hazard."
The difficulty of regulatory adaptation is thus amplified. Traditional securities accounts can be traced back to the ultimate beneficiary through a central registry, while MAM/PAMM allow managers to split positions among multiple liquidity providers and then transfer orders to third-country exchanges through the Prime-of-Prime structure of LPs. Once funds enter this "nested" structure, home country regulators cannot see the complete holdings or monitor leverage ratios, and anti-money laundering reports can only capture fragmented information. Even more problematic is cross-border marketing: managers set up websites in country A, open custodian accounts in country B, rent servers in country C, and investors are scattered globally. If an entity absconds, multi-country judicial cooperation is required to freeze assets, exponentially increasing enforcement costs. The French Financial Markets Authority (AMF) therefore issued a complete ban on PAMMs, stating that "decentralized custody weakens the immediacy of supervision and conflicts with the risk control principle of the EU Investment Services Directive."
The red lines of qualification management are also easily crossed. The US CFTC requires any individual or institution that accepts client authorization and receives performance fees to register as a CTA (Commodity Trading Advisor) and join the NFA, submitting audited disclosure documents annually; the UK FCA classifies collective asset management as a "regulated activity," requiring an investment manager (IFPRU Investment Firm) license. However, authorization letters for MAMs/PAMMs are often completed using standardized templates provided by brokers. Managers can circumvent CTA requirements by simply selecting "I am not a U.S. citizen," and then circumvent the definition of an investment advisor under the guise of "technical signal sharing." If regulators tacitly approve this gray path of "authorization-copy trading," it's tantamount to opening a "shadow asset management" track outside the licensing system—a track without entry requirements, capital adequacy ratios, or continuous reporting. This weakens the competitive incentive of licensed institutions and damages the overall compliance ecosystem of the industry. Therefore, since 2019, the U.S. has included pooled accounts under the regulatory framework of CPOs (Commodity Pool Operators), no longer accepting "channel exemption" defenses, effectively closing off the compliance space for PAMMs.
Structural flaws in the trading mechanism itself can also amplify market volatility. PAMM employs a "single-account centralized trading, end-of-period redistribution" model. When a large investor withdraws funds mid-term, their corresponding virtual shares must be forcibly liquidated at the then-current market price. The manager is forced to reverse-liquidate positions to meet the redemption, instantly triggering stop-loss orders for remaining investors and causing a second round of liquidation. While MAMs (Multi-Account Managers) execute trades independently, the same order is split across dozens of accounts for simultaneous execution, creating a short-term demand cluster for illiquid currency pairs, potentially causing a 10-30 point price surge. If combined with high-frequency EAs (Expert Advisors), a single signal can generate 200 sell orders within 500 milliseconds, enough to trigger liquidity protection mechanisms in some brokers and subsequently impact the interbank market. Regulators worry that this "cluster-style stampede" will interfere with normal price discovery and even create liquidity gaps in smaller cryptocurrencies, directly conflicting with the "orderly, transparent, and low-volatility" policy goals pursued by countries like the US, Japan, and France. Therefore, they prefer a complete ban rather than sacrificing systemic stability for localized efficiency.
In summary, MAM/PAMM condenses "managed asset management" into a single webpage button, but leaves regulators and end-investors with the triple risks of fiduciary responsibility, cross-border penetration, and market impact. For countries like the US, Japan, and France, which implement strict licensing and behavioral regulations, allowing its existence means simultaneously incurring additional costs in terms of qualifications, disclosure, enforcement, and cross-border cooperation, while the benefit is limited to lowering the barrier for some retail clients. Weighing the options, regulators have chosen to directly deny the compliance status of this mechanism to maintain the integrity and authority of the existing asset management framework, fundamentally preventing the continued spread of the gray ecosystem of "unlicensed asset management—aggregated funds—cross-border arbitrage."

Key Compliance Points for Non-Swiss Citizens Providing Foreign Exchange Investment Management Services to Swiss Citizens through the MAM/PAMM Model

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In the context of two-way foreign exchange investment, non-Swiss citizens can provide investment management services to Swiss citizens using the MAM (Multi-Account Manager) or PAMM (Percentage Allocation Management Module) model. However, the core prerequisite is strict compliance with relevant Swiss financial regulations. Compliance is the core premise and requirement for providing such services, which can be analyzed in detail from the perspectives of regulatory framework, licensing requirements, compliance pathways, and cross-border regulatory connections.
Switzerland implements stringent regulatory standards for the financial services sector, particularly for asset management, investment advice, and fund management services. It has established a systematic regulatory framework, with relevant regulatory responsibilities primarily defined by specific institutions and specific regulations. The Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA), as the core regulatory body, is responsible for authorizing and approving financial intermediaries and for their daily supervision, making it a key entity in ensuring the compliance of financial services. Furthermore, the Financial Services Act (FINIG/FinSA) and the Financial Institutions Act (FinIA), which came into effect in 2020, further clarify the regulatory bottom line, requiring any individual or institution providing investment-related services to obtain the corresponding regulatory license. This provision sets a basic entry threshold for investment management services, including the MAM/PAMM model.
Regarding whether a Swiss license is required to provide such services, the core criterion is not the nationality of the service provider, but rather a comprehensive consideration of multiple dimensions, including the service recipients, the nature of the services, the service scenarios, and the cooperating parties. Specifically, the primary criterion is whether the service directly targets the Swiss market or Swiss clients, including Swiss residents and citizens. Secondly, the nature of the service must be clearly defined. If the MAM/PAMM services provided involve core investment services such as "portfolio management" or "investment advice," a corresponding regulatory license is generally required. Furthermore, whether the service provider has a business location in Switzerland, whether it frequently promotes services to Swiss clients, and whether it conducts business through authorized Swiss intermediaries (such as licensed Swiss banks or asset management companies) all affect the licensing requirements. It is crucial to emphasize that even if a non-Swiss citizen conducts business outside of Switzerland (such as in jurisdictions like Cyprus, the UK, or Singapore), if their MAM/PAMM services to Swiss clients involve "active solicitation" or establish a regular, continuous service relationship, they are highly likely to trigger FINMA regulatory requirements and thus need to meet the corresponding compliance conditions.
There are three main compliance paths for non-Swiss citizens to provide such cross-border services. The applicable scenarios, implementation difficulties, and costs vary depending on the path, and the appropriate solution can be chosen based on actual business needs. The first path is to directly apply for FINMA authorization. As a foreign individual or institution, one can apply to become a licensed asset manager. However, this path has high implementation thresholds, including a complex application process, long approval cycles, and strict requirements for capital adequacy ratios, professional qualifications, and a robust anti-money laundering (AML) internal control system, resulting in high overall compliance costs. The second path is to cooperate with Swiss licensed institutions. This involves establishing a partnership with a Swiss institution already authorized by FINMA (such as a commercial bank or professional asset management company). The Swiss licensed institution acts as the legal service provider, while the non-Swiss citizen participates in the business as a technology support provider or investment strategy provider, signing a standardized compliance cooperation agreement that clearly defines the rights and obligations of both parties. This path is easier to implement because it doesn't require service providers to directly apply for a Swiss license, making it a common compliance model used by external fund managers when providing services to Swiss clients through the MAM/PAMM system. The third path strictly limits the service recipients and scenarios, meaning not actively soliciting services from Swiss clients, but only providing services when individual Swiss clients initiate service requests, and all services are completed overseas. This type of situation may qualify for the regulatory exemption for "reverse solicitation." However, it's crucial to note that the scope of "reverse solicitation" exemptions in Switzerland is continuously narrowing, and the relevant criteria are becoming increasingly stringent. Adopting this path requires engaging a professional Swiss financial compliance agency for a comprehensive assessment beforehand to avoid crossing regulatory red lines due to misjudgment of exemption conditions.
In cross-border service scenarios, it's also necessary to pay attention to the alignment between the regulatory licenses of one's own country or region and Swiss regulatory requirements. If a service provider's jurisdiction is regulated by the EU's Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II), or holds a license issued by other international regulatory bodies (such as the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) or the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission (CySEC), such licenses do not automatically gain Swiss regulatory recognition and cannot be directly used to provide MAM/PAMM services within Switzerland or to Swiss clients. This restriction stems from the lack of a complete mutual recognition mechanism for financial regulations between Switzerland and the EU. Cross-border service providers must individually meet Swiss regulatory requirements and cannot rely on compliance qualifications from other jurisdictions to circumvent Swiss domestic regulations.
In summary, it is legally feasible for non-Swiss citizens to provide foreign exchange investment management services to Swiss citizens using the MAM/PAMM model. Nationality is not a limiting factor for providing such services. The core conclusion is that providing such services requires full compliance. This can be achieved either by directly applying for and obtaining the relevant authorization from FINMA to acquire a Swiss asset management license, or by collaborating with a licensed Swiss institution and utilizing a compliant Swiss entity to conduct business. Ultimately, the core of cross-border services lies not in the nationality of the service provider, but in whether it can fully meet Switzerland's stringent financial regulatory requirements. Ensuring that every business环节 complies with the specific requirements of relevant regulatory rules such as FINMA, FinSA, and FinIA is a crucial prerequisite for guaranteeing the legal and compliant operation of the business.

Clear authorization path, compliant company structure, complete personal qualifications, traceable risk control details, and flawless continuous audits.

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In the two-way trading scenario of forex margin, MAM and PAMM are essentially collective management tools for "managing on behalf of others." If foreign individuals want to use these two vehicles to receive funds from Swiss clients, they must first let go of the ingrained mindset of "nationality as an original sin"—FINMA's focus is not on the passport cover, but on the commercial substance, control chain, and continuous compliance nodes. Non-Swiss asset managers can obtain legal operating licenses by breaking down regulatory dimensions and embedding them into the entire business process. However, this requires completely replicating the Swiss asset management standards into their own operating system; failing to do so renders the entire system ineffective.
The first step is to secure the authorization path. Any activity that aims to collect funds from Swiss clients for profit and exercises investment discretion will be categorized under "asset management," triggering the licensing requirements of Article 3, Paragraph b of the Financial Institutions Act. If an overseas entity merely "proactively reaches" Swiss clients through websites, emails, or telephones, it constitutes cross-border service. Even without renting a physical office locally, it still needs to apply for a "cross-border portfolio manager licence" from FINMA. In addition to a business plan, risk control manual, and capital verification report, the approval materials must also include a "Swiss touchpoint description"—detailing the client source, marketing scripts, server location, and order execution path to prove that although located abroad, the risks remain under the scrutiny of Swiss regulators. If the management scale exceeds CHF 5 million or there are plans to station staff in Switzerland long-term, it is necessary to upgrade to a "representative office" or "branch office" model, obtain an institutional license before discussing client contracts, otherwise it will be regarded as an unlicensed permanent establishment and face mandatory deregistration and fines.
The second step is to align the "company structure" with Swiss standards. Most newly established entities choose a limited liability company (GmbH) or a joint-stock company (AG) as the vehicle. Registered capital is just the entry requirement—a minimum of CHF 20,000 must be paid up for a GmbH, while an AG requires a minimum of CHF 100,000, of which CHF 50,000 must be paid up. More crucial is the "geographical composition" of the board of directors: if there are fewer than three directors, at least one must be a Swiss or EU citizen and reside in Switzerland; if there are more than three, Swiss directors must constitute a majority. This "local director" is not a figurehead; FINMA will verify during due diligence whether they actually participate in the anti-money laundering committee, investment committee, and client access meetings, and reserves the right to veto. Meanwhile, companies must employ a Compliance Officer (CO) and an Anti-Money Laundering Officer (AMLO) registered with FINMA. These two positions cannot be held concurrently, and both must submit proof of no criminal record for the past ten years, professional liability insurance, and at least 40 hours of continuous training annually. Any absence of these qualifications will be highlighted in red in the annual audit report, triggering subsequent on-site inspections.
The third step involves a dual-track system of "individual licenses" and "institutional licenses." Even if the company holds a license, if the individual signing the investment authorization, order placement instructions, or allocation letter does not possess "registered asset manager" status, FINMA can still classify it as "unlicensed individual business operation." Applicants must pass the Swiss Securities Institute (SBI) or equivalent examination, covering portfolio theory, behavioral finance, the Swiss client suitability system, and money laundering case analysis. After passing the exam, they can then apply for membership in a self-regulatory organization (SRO). Currently, SROs recognized by FINMA include ARIF, VQF, and OARG, with ARIF being more favorable to managers from French-speaking regions. In addition to education, work experience, and letters of recommendation, membership application materials must include a "conflict of interest map," marking all potential conflict of interest points such as proprietary trading, external copy trading, and commission sharing, along with corresponding firewall measures. Only when the individual member number and company license number appear side-by-side in the client contract is the service considered "fully compliant."
The fourth step is to embed the three red lines of anti-money laundering, investor protection, and cross-border data protection into the operational end. The latest revised version of the Swiss Anti-Money Laundering Regulation includes foreign exchange leveraged trading in the "high-risk product" list. Before clients deposit funds, they must complete three checks: video KYC, beneficiary identification, and due diligence on the source of wealth. If any check is missing, subsequent profit sharing is considered a "suspicious transaction," and the bank has the right to freeze funds and report to MROS. For those using the PAMM percentage allocation model, an "auditable account statement" must be sent to all investors on the allocation date (usually weekly or monthly). The account statement format must comply with Annex 3 of the "Collective Investment Scheme Disclosure Guidelines," including each transaction number, spread cost, overnight interest, slippage compensation, and performance bonus calculation formula. Investors have the right to request a review within 24 hours, and the manager must provide the original MT4/MT5 server logs or FIX messages within 48 hours. If the MAM sub-account model is used, each sub-account must be independently segregated from the main account in a bank trust account, and a "provisional exposure warning" must be sent to the custodian bank daily. Once the margin ratio exceeds 70%, the bank can force liquidation and notify FINMA.
The fifth step is ongoing regulatory "post-evaluation." Licensed institutions must undergo dual audits annually: first, a routine financial audit, performed by a "Big 4" firm or equivalent firm on the FINMA-designated list; second, a special compliance audit, focusing on whether customer classification is appropriate, whether leverage ratios exceed limits, and whether marketing materials are exaggerated. Any "exceptions" listed in the audit report must be rectified and a response submitted within 30 days. If similar deficiencies occur for two consecutive years, FINMA can initiate a "license downgrade" procedure, placing the cross-border manager on an "enhanced supervision list." In this case, additional reports will be required quarterly, along with a regulatory surcharge of over 20%. For repeated violations, FINMA has the right to revoke the license directly and publish the revocation on its website for three years, during which time reapplication is prohibited.
Therefore, non-Swiss citizens can provide foreign exchange asset management services to Swiss clients through MAM or PAMM vehicles, but the entire business process must be "Swiss-ized": a clear authorization path, a compliant company structure, complete personal qualifications, traceable risk control details, and flawless continuous audits. Any gap in any link, regardless of nationality or number of overseas regulatory licenses held, will be considered "unlicensed operation" in Switzerland, facing civil damages, administrative fines, and even criminal liability. Breaking down the above requirements into over 200 actionable checkpoints and implementing them one by one is the only shortcut to legally operating the business.

In the field of two-way forex trading, every trader needs to confront a core question: Is the initial motivation for participating in forex trading simply to pursue profits, or is it seen as a worthwhile career and a genuine interest?

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This difference in initial motivation not only shapes drastically different trading mindsets but also fundamentally affects their experience and perception of the trading process and its outcome.
If a trader's sole goal is profit, their trading journey is often accompanied by a heavy psychological burden, likely resulting in hardship, difficulty, and a high risk of suffering. This is because profit targets cause traders to over-focus on short-term results, and every fluctuation can trigger dramatic emotional swings, turning trading itself into a passive, task-like activity. Conversely, if traders view forex trading as a combination of career and hobby, the trading process takes on a completely different character. Trading is no longer simply about pursuing profits, but rather a process of self-improvement and value realization. The overall experience is more relaxed and composed, and traders can even find happiness and satisfaction in in-depth study and continuous refinement.
This difference in mindset becomes even more pronounced when facing trading risks, especially significant losses. Traders solely focused on profit often define large losses as a disastrous misfortune, falling into negative emotions such as self-blame and anxiety. They struggle to objectively examine the reasons behind the losses and may even make more irrational trading decisions in their eagerness to recover. Traders who treat trading as a career and hobby, however, view the same large losses with a more proactive and rational perspective. They see losses as a costly lesson in financial risk management, focusing on extracting valuable trading experience from them, identifying weaknesses in their trading system, and ultimately iterating and upgrading their trading skills.
In fact, whether profit-driven or interest-driven, traders face the same market environment, trading rules, and risks; the core difference lies only in their perspective. The difference lies essentially in the mindset of passive response versus proactive control. This cognitive difference is not unique to the forex trading field; it is prevalent in real life and other professional scenarios. Take the work scenario of programmers as an example. Faced with the same coding or solution design tasks, the average programmer's mindset is often passive acceptance—"This is a task assigned by the boss; I'll use company resources to complete the work while incidentally honing my skills." With this mindset, work is more of a means of making a living, making it difficult to gain a deep sense of accomplishment. However, seasoned experts in the industry view tasks with a proactive, exploratory mindset. They believe, "This project is very challenging, which is perfect for verifying the stability and feasibility of my newly learned architecture," transforming work into a vehicle for proactively improving their abilities and achieving breakthroughs in self-worth while overcoming difficulties.
A more insightful comparison might exist between prisoners and ascetic monks in seclusion. If we observe them in the same context, we discover a seemingly absurd yet profoundly meaningful phenomenon: they both eat the simplest vegetarian food and live in cramped spaces of only a few square meters; from a behavioral perspective, both are in a state of "isolation." The core difference lies in the control over this state—a prisoner's confinement is passive, a constraint and punishment imposed by external forces; while an ascetic's retreat is active, a self-chosen method of spiritual practice aimed at achieving inner clarity and spiritual elevation. This contrast precisely illustrates the decisive role of proactive cognition in the meaning and experience of behavior.
Returning to the essence of forex trading, if traders can clearly clarify their initial motivation for participating in trading, determining whether they are passively pursuing profits or actively cultivating their career and interests, and truly understand and establish the core difference between proactive and passive cognition, they have essentially found the key to mature trading, and achieving stable and sustainable trading success will no longer be far away.

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13711580480@139.com

+86 137 1158 0480

+86 137 1158 0480

+86 137 1158 0480

z.x.n@139.com

Mr. Z-X-N

China · Guangzhou

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